Introduction
The subject of this article is the semantics of focus, i.e. the development of a framework in which we can formulate the influence of focus on the semantic and pragmatic interpretation. In section (1), I will discuss such a framework, structured meanings. In section (2), I will point out some of its shortcomings, as it is currently worked outi they have to do with cases involving multiple foci. In (3), I develop a general representation format in which we can cope with these problematic cases. Finally, in (4) I will discuss some extensions and possible problems, among others a combined semantic treatment of focus and topic.
1.

The Structured Meaning Approach to Focus
Some common ass umptions of current theories on the syntax and semantics of focus, essen tially going back to Jackendoff (1972) , are the following:
-Focus consists of a feature that is assigned to a node in the syntactic representation of a sentence (in theories that distinguish between different representation levels, focus is as signed at surface structure).
-The focus feature might be associ ated with a focus operator, such as onlYi the focus operator has to c-command its focus. We call this "bound focus".
-In phonology, the focus feature is spelled out by sentence accent (I disregard other ways of marking focus, such as cleft constructions). In case of a complex category, the position of the sentence accent may be sensitive to syntactic structure and to semantic properties such as givenness . For example, for English and German it has bee n argued that in a case where a head-argument structure is in focus, the accent is realized on the argument (d. Selkirk 1984 , von Stechow &t Uhmann 1987 . Also, it has been argued that constituents that refer to entities given in the context are deaccented, although they may be part of the focus (d. Ladd 1980 , Uitscher 1983 ).
-In semantics, the focus feature induces a partition of the semantic representation of the sentence into the part that is in focus and the complement part that is not in focus, commonly called the background. This partition is esse ntial for the semantics and/or pragmatics of the sentence.
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Let US get more specifiC by loo king at an example:
(1) John only introduced Bill to SUE.
This sentence, with accent on Sue, has at least two readings: (i) The only person John in troduced Bill to is Sue; (ij) the only thing John did is introducing Bill to Sue. For the first case, we can assume that Sue is in focus; in the second case, we can assume that intTOduceil Bill to
Sue is in focus. The rules of focus marking by accen t lead to the same result in both cases (in the latter one, accent is realized on the last argument). The adverbial particle only c-commands the focus in both cases.
( 1 ') a. introduced Bill to Sue introduced Bill to Sue
There are essentially two representation formats that were designed to capture the con bibution of the partitioning into focus and background to the semantic interpretation, namely STRUC11JRE D MEANINGS (d. Klein . von Stechow 1982 , Jacobs 1983 , also Williams 1980 and ALTERNATIVE SEMANTICS (Roath 1985) . Here, I will concentrate on the structured meanings framework; see von Stechow (1989) for a compariso n.
A structured meaning is a pair consisting of a background part and a focus part. The background is of a type that can be applied to the focus. If this application is carri ed out, we arri ve at the ordinary semantic representation. Focus-sensitive operators are applied to these structured meanings. The two readings of our example are represented as follows: (2) a. only(<l.x.lDtrod(j,x,b), 5»
b. oD1y{<l.P.P(j), b.introd (x,s,b» ) Let us assume the following semantics for only. It says that the background representation applies to the focus representation, and that the background representation applies to no other entity that is comparable with the focus representation (see section 4.1 for a more refined treatment, distinguishing asserti onal meaning and presuppositional meaning).
Comparabili ty, which will be discussed shortly, is expressed by -.
(3) only«a,Jl»: H a(�) . VX(X� . a(X) -. X=�], where X is a variable of the type of �.
For our two examples, we get the following representations:
(4) a . lDtroci (j,s,b) . \fx [x-s . iDtrocl(j,x,b) -.x=s] b. lDtrod (j,s,b) . \fP [P-1x.introd(x,s,b) . p(J) -. P=1xJntrod(x,s,b»)
The limitation to comparable entities is meant to capture contextual and ontological re strictions. For example, the lint reading might be true even if John introduced more persons to Sue, but these persons are not contextual ly salient (this is the case if the sentence is used to answer a question like Did John introduce Bill tu,d Paul to Sue?). The second reading depends even more on this restriction; without it, it would express that introducing Blll to Sue is the only property John has, which of course canno t be true, as he has many additional properties, like being a man, or being identical to himself (d. Lerner &t Zimmermann 1983) . The restriction can be expressed in various ways, as a condition formulated with respect to the meaning of the express ion in focus, as suggested here (d. also Roath 1985) , or alternatively as a condition formulated with respect to the meaning of the background expressi on, as suggested in Jacobs (1988) . As the precise semantics of only and other operators is not at stake here, I
will not elaborate on this point further.
We have seen how the partitioning into focus and background aff ects the interpretation of a sentence containing a focus..sensi tive operator. Similarly, it may affect the interpretation of a sentence where no overt focus-sensitive operator is present. For example, the two interpretations of the sentence (5) John introduced Bill to SUE. might be used in differen t contexts, depending on the focus; with focus on Sue, it might be an answer to To whom dill John introduce Bill?, and with focus on introduced Bill to Sue, it might be an answer to What dill John tID?
According to Jacobs (1984) , cases of bound focus and unbound ("free '') focus are actually not different at all. He proposes that the illocutionary operator that expresses the sentence mood (asserti on, question, directive, optative etc.) may bind the focus. Let us assume ASS ERT as asserti on operator; then we get the following representations for the two readings:
(6) a. ASSEKT (d",Jntrod(j,x,b) , s» b. ASSEKT(<lP .P(j), lx.introd(x,s,b» ) Assertion of a structured representation <a, �> can be described as follows, following Jackendoff (1972) : At the curren t point of discourse, the entities X for which a(X) holds are under discussion. and it is stated that, among these entities, it holds for � that a(�). For our example this means that in (a), the persons x for which it holds that John introduced Bill to x are under discussio n, and in (b), the properties P that John has are under discussi on. In both cases, it is stated that John introduced Bill to Sue. I skip here over differen t uses of free focus, like presentational vs. contrastive focus as argued for by Rochemont (1986) ; they might be handled by differen t Ulocutionary operators.
The meaning of assertion can be specified more fonnall y, given the concept of an assertion as a modification of shared assum ptions of speaker and hearer. Let us call the shared assum ptions the "common ground", which is represented simply by a set of poss ible worlds (d. Stalnaker 1979) , and let us assume that the semantic representation of a sentence 41 is a set of possible worlds (III ). Then we can give the fonowing definition of assertion (d. Krifka 1990): (7) ASSEKT« a,Il» maps a commo n ground c to a common ground ft, where ft is the intersection of c with the set of possi ble worlds for which a(p) is true, i.e. c'=cn [a(�) Note that the partitioning between focus and background does not play any role for the semantics proper of the asserti on operator, but affects only its felidty conditions. Conditions (a) and (b) guarantee that the proposition to be asserted is relevant -it should not already be established or excluded by the current commo n ground. Condition (c) says that it is relevant which contextually salient alternative is asserted -that is, the alternatives are assertable as well, and their assertio n would make a difference. As usual, if the felidty conditions are not satisfied, they may give rise to acmmmoda tions in the sense of Lewis (1979) .
2.
Multiple Foci
The theory of structured meanings seems to work quite well in examples like the ones con sidered above. However, we also find cases in which a sentence has more than one focus.
One kind of multiple focus that has bee n discussed (d. Taglicht 1984 , Roath 1985 , von Stechow 1989 , Jacobs 1988 , to appear) are cases like the following one:
John only introduced BILL to SUE. This sentence has a reading saying that the only pair of persons such that John introduced the first to the second is Bill and Sue. We clearly have two fod, on Bill and on Slle, that are related to only one focus operator, only.
It is relatively straightforward to account for cases like (8): We have to allow for back grounds to be applied to more than one focus. There are different methods to implement this technically. Perhaps the most perspicuous way is to provide for USTS in our semantic representation language. Sentence (8) then gets the following analysis:
ODly(dx-y.introd(j,y,x), b-s» Here, be. is a list of two names, and x-y is a list of two variables (which can be bound by a lambda-operator). If we represent a list variable by h-t (where h is the head and t is the tail), application is defined recursively as 1h-t.4'(a-p) = It[lh.4'(a)](p). Given the re presentation (9) and the interpretation of only in (3), we get the following interpretation: (10) introd(j,s,b) Ir: \fxey[xey-bes Ir: introd(J,y,x) ... xey=bes] This says that John introduced Bill to Sue, and that there is no pair comparable but not identical to Bill and Sue such that John introduced the first to the second. This is an adequate analysis of the natural interpretation of this sentence.
To distinguish this case of multiple foci from others discussed later, I will not call it multiple focus, but CDMPLEX focus.
There are cases of true multiple fad, that is, cases with more than one focus operator, as shown by Jacobs (1984 Jacobs ( , 1988 . To distinguish between differen t pairs of focus operator and associa ted focus, I will follow Jacobs in using a coindexing convention (although there will be no coindexing in my final proposal). Perhaps the simplest case is exemplified by the following sentences:
Evenl OOHN]F1 drankonln lWATER]F2. Here we have one sentence that contains two focus operators and two foci. In this case, the foci do not overlap. Let us assume that eoen contri butes to the meaning that there are alternatives to the focus for which it would be more probable that the proposition holds. For example, erma JOHN "me says that John came, and that there are persons for which it was more likely that they came. Then the meaning of (11) can be rendered as: John drinks water and no other comparable substance, and there are persons for which it would have been more likely that they drink water and no other mmparable substance. The meaning of (13) can be rendered as: John drank water, John did not drink something that is mmparable but not identical to water, and there are things X that are mmparable but not identical to water such that it would be more likely that John drank X and only X.
Fmall y, we have cases where one focus operator forms the focus of another one:
[Most people drank water at some time during yesterday's party.]
This means that John drank water and only water (i.e. nothing mmparable to water), and that there are alternatives X to only such that Joim tlrtln1c X JDtIter would be more probable. It see ms that the only alternative to only is .Iso; witness the common locution not only ... , but .Iso ..
•. Hence the last part of the meaning has to be spelled out as: It was more likely that John drank also water (i.e. drank water in addition to other things), than that John drank only water.
TIle phenomenon of multiple focus is of morse more widespread when we follow the analysis of "free " foci given in Jambs (1984) . Then every sentence that mntains an overt focus operator actually will have at least two foci, one related to the overt operator, and one related to the iUocutionary operator. Jambs (to appear) discussed this case with the following example (15) to which he assigned the two structures (a, b ASSERT(d.x.only(dy3z[novel(z) &r by(y,z) &r knows(p, z»), X» , g» Given the informal analyses of only and ASSERT developed above, we arrive at the fol lowing: It is asserted that John knows a novel by Goethe and that John does not know a novel by another, comparable person. And the felicity conditions are that those persons x are under discussi on such that John knows only a novel by x. The other reading, (IS.c), should make the same assertion, but with respect to a different felicity condition, namely that the properties of Peter are under discussi on.
For a discussi on of the accentual marking of sentences with multiple foci, see Jacobs (1988 , to appear) . In this article, I will try to give a compositional semantics of sentences with multiple foci, something which has not bee n done before -for example, Lyons &r Hirst (1990) exclude them explicitly from their discussion because they are "semantically complicated". I will presuppose the following assumptions, which are suggested by the examples we have seen so far:
-There is a one-to-one mapping between focus operators and foci. Remember that I assumed cases like (8) to contain only one, albeit complex, focus.
-Focus is assigned to constituents, or (in case of complex focus) to sets of non-overlapping constituents (see section 4.8 for potential counterexamples).
-Focus operators c�ommand their focus. This is obvious in the cases of overt operators we have considered so far. A potentially problem arises with illocutionary operators. Some illocutionary operators in some languages obviously c�ommand the whole sentence; one example is the interrog ative est-qlle ce in French. In other cases, different sentence mood s are expressed by distinctions in syntactic structure (inversion), intonation, or special categories of the finite verb. We have to assu me that, on some level of syntactic representation, these markings are spelled out by operators with widest scope. Some potential problems with overt operators are discussed in section 4.2.
-If one focus operator c�mmands directly (i.e. without intervening other focus operators) two or more foci, one including the others, then it is associa ted with the most comprehensive focus:
where a does not contain focus operators that �mmand p. The only candidate of such a construction we have seen so far is (13), a case where two focus operators seem to be associa ted with the same focus. This example then has to be analyzed as:
The focus operator only is assoc iated with the most comprehensive focus, F 2. Of course, this example does not really motivate our assumption. However, the discuss ion of the issues involved here are relatively complicated, and I will come back to it in section 4.6.
-There is a certain tendency that a focus operator occurs as close as possible to its focus. However, it seems that there are no bounding nodes; witness the following example (which goes back to Jackendoff 1972):
Sam event saw [NP the man [s who was wearing a [RED)F1 hat)).
In this example, the scope of wen (not to be confused with its focus) is the phrase SIl'ID the man who was wearing a red hat; and as it has to c�ommand its scope, it cannot occur deeper 3.
Deriving Representations with Focus Compositionall y
In this section, I will specify compositional rules for recursive structured meanings. The framework must be flexible enough to cover the cases of complex foci and multiple foci we have considered so far, represented by the following examples:
( 1 9 -(a)'t is a type (of functions from a-denotations to 't-denotations); -(Je't is a type (of a list of a-denotations and 't-denotations); -<G,'t> is a type (of a focus-background structure) I assume that focus-sensitive operators always are applied to entities of a type that ends in t, such as intransitive predicates, type (e)t, predicate modifiers, type «e)t)(e)t, etc. The only case where this is problematic is names or pronouns, which arguably are of type e. But we can analyse names and pronouns, like NPs in general, as generalized quantifiers, type «e)t)t, and thus get a type ending in t. This assum ption about the types of the operands of focus.sens itive operators will allow a relatively simple treatment, without employing rules of operator raising, quantifying in, or operator storage.
Semantic rules typically involve functional application. But functional application has to be generalized to cover focus-background structures. In particular, we must provide for a rule that allows for focus-background-information to be projected to higher nodes. So we have to define an extended version of functional application that takes care of this case. In these definitions, Xa stands for a variable of type 0'. (21.a) describes the basic case of functional application. (b) and (c) say that the focus is stored when a focus-background structure is combined with an argument, or a function that does not take focus-background structures. The variable X makes sure that the original focus can be recovered after the application. (d) is the rule for complex focus; it concatenates two foci and their correspo nding variables to a list, which is stored. Note that I do not assume, in general, that the first argument of the background is of the same type as the focus; but in all real applications, these types will stand in the relation of BEING DERIVED FROM. For example, a focus-background structure of type « an, 0'> should be said to be derived from "C (the type of the representation when the background is applied to the focus). 5imilarly, a complex focus-background structure of type « JI.)« an, O'>, JI.'> is said to be derived from type « an, 0'>, and ultimately derived from type "C. This sugges ts the following definition:
, then "C is derived from "C " .
I give some examples to show how this framework can be used to formulate gramma tical rules that cover focus-sensi tive constructions. Let us ass ume the following rules; their syntactic part is dehberately kept simple. If A is a syntactic tree , then [ A ] is the semantic representation of A in our semantic representation language. I take intransitive verbs to be of the category VP, transitive verbs to be of the category V, and ditransitive verbs to be of the category V. Let x, y, z, x' etc. be variables of type e; P, po etc. variables of type (e)t; R, R' etc. variables of type (e)(e)t; 5, 5' etc. variables of type (e)(e)(e)t; and T, T etc. variables of type «e)t)t, which will be abbreviated by q. The variable 0 is used for focus-sensi tive operators, which might be of different types; I use fo as an abbrevia tion of these types fo. The first four rules specify the binding of argument places of verbs by NPs. Rule Sp covers the focusation of a mnstituent. The feature P has to be realized appropriately by sentence accent. Rule SO covers focus operators; its function will become clear below.
Let us now look at the derivation of some examples. I start with an example of complex focus, (19.a), which shows the use of lists. In the following derivation tree, I specify the syntactic expressi on, its category, its representation, and the type of its representation. I also give the syntactic/semantic rules (23), and sometimes the subelauses for the extended application which I use (21). The terms John, Sue, Bill are taken to be quantifiers; we have e.g. John = AP.P(j). In this and the following examples, I first give a representation using coindexing; this is for clarification only and has no theoretical status.
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I only ; FO ; only ; fo 1/ So only introduced Bill to Slle ; VP ;
Application of second argument: a only« lT-T'1x.T'(ly.T(1z.introd(x,y,z»), Bill-Sue» Let us assu me a meaning postulate for only that is like (3) but allows only to be applied to all expressio ns of a type that ends in t:
where X is a variable of the type of Il and v is a (vector 00 variable(s) of the types of the arguments of a(1l). Then example (24) am be spelled out as follows:
=Sue-BillJJ ; (e)t Application of the subject yields the following result:
(24") I laIm ; NP ;Jobn;q 1/ Sl 101m only introduced Bill to Slle ; S; Jobn(1x[Sue(ly.BiIl(1z.lntrod(x,y,z»» &:
; t Spelling out the quantifiers wlll yield the following:
Now we am assume that quantifiers generated by an individual, such as AP.P(s), are com parable only to quantifiers that are generated by an individual as well (note that a sentence like only lohn luis II c.r cannot be refuted by No, II mII n luis II c.r, too.). Furthermore, we should assume that if two lists are comparable, then their respective elements are comparable. Then we am reduce (24-) to the following interpretation:
This says: John introduced Bill to Sue, and that there is no pair x and y comparable, but not identical to Sue and Bill such that John introduced y to x.
Next, we will look at an example with two independent focus operators, (19.b). We ass ume here the following semantics of even:
, where v and X as in (25) and < p is a probability relation.
Thus, even contributes to the meaning that there are alternatives X to the focus Il such that a(Il)(v) is less probable than a(XXv). In addition, we could try to incorporate that a(IlXv) is considered ' 'unlikely" in general; however, the proposed analysis should suffice for our purpose, as we are not concerned with a detailed analysis of the semantics of even (see Jacobs 1983, Kay 1990 for that). 
lohn ;NP ; Jobn ; q I 5F 101m ; NPp ; « T.T, John> ; « q)q, q> I I eom;FO;eftIl;fo 1/ So even lohn ; NP; eYen« l T.T, Jolm»
This says (a) that John drank water, and no other comparable substance, and (b) that there are comparable individuals x' for which it is more probable that they drank only water. This is a correct interpreta tion of our exam p le. We assumed here that indefinite quantifiers like A.P[p(x) &: W(x» ) are compatible only to other indefinite quantifiers, hence we can reduce the condition T_ater to P-W.
To obtain this reading, it is crucial that even gets scope over only. This scope relationship is a consequence of the fact that the NP to which even is adjoined has only in its scope (or syntactically, only is c-commanded by that NP). The syntactic rules guarantee the right scoping.
We have seen how cases are handled in which one operator is in the scope of another. Our next exam p le concerns a case in which one operator is not only in the scope, but also in the focus, of another, namely (19.c). 
This says that John drank water, that he did nothing comparable, and that there are properties comparable to the property of drinking water and doing nothing else such that it would have been more likely that John had them. This is a correct representation of the reading of our example.
Let us now look at the treabnent of (19.d), where two operators seem to share one focus. In our reconstruction, a focus operator can be associa ted with only one focus. But we may apply the focusation rule to one constituent twice, one time for each operator, and get an adequate interpretation:
..,.. 
1-
Spelling out water and binding the subject argument by j (via rule 5 1 ) yields as representation of John eoen only drank fJ1tlter: (a) that John drank water and no other comparable substance, and (b) that there is a substance P comparable to water such that it would have been more probable that John drank only that substance. This renders the reading of our example adequately.
It is crucial for this derivation that the lint focus operator, tmly, is associa ted with the last focus feature of the NP, leaving additional focus features to other operators. This is accomplished by the semantic rule for the combination of a focus operator with a constituent (23, So). This rule expects a focus-backgrou nd structure, but allows for the focus to consist itself of a focus-backgro und structure, which would then be passed to the complex semantic representation, such that it can be submitted to higher operators. Also, with this example it becomes obvious why the semantic part of rule SF was formulated in that compHcated way (''X is of the type from which the type of (A) is derived that is not a focus-background type").
Finall y, let us look at a case in which one operator is the focus of another, (19.e). This says (a) that John drank water, and no other comparable substance, and that the proposition (a) is less probable than another one where only is replaced by a focus operator comparable with only. Let us assume that the only comparable operator is mo, and let us specify the meaning of also as follows: (31) also« a, JS» :++ 1v[a(JS)(v) 6: 3X[X-JS 6: "X=JS 6: a(X)(v))), where v and X as in (25). That is, also says that the background representation applies to the focus representation, and that in addition there is an entity comparable with, but different from the focus re presentation to which the background representation applies as well. Then we get the following representation for our example: (32) 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: VP[p-W 6: 3y(clrank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=W)) 6: 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: \fP[P-W 6: 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: P(y)J -+ P=w]J < p 3y[clrank(j,y) 6: W(y) 6: 3P[P-W 6: .. P=W 6: 3y[drank(j,y) 6: P(y)]]] This says that John drank water, and only water, and that the probability that John drank water and only water is smaDer than the probability that John drank water and also some other salient substance comparable with water. This is a correct representation of (19.e). Let us assume an analysis of assertio n like in (7). We arri ve at the following result: Thus, the asserti on of John [drank _ter]F changes the common ground to those worlds in which John drank water. The felicity conditions say that this asserti on is informative at the current point of discourse, that it is not excluded already, that there are other, salient properties comparable with the property of drinking water that could have been asserted of John as well, and that they would have made a difference .
H the sentence which is asserted contains a focus operator, then it is necessa ry to introduce another focus; otherwise the application conditions for ASSERT could not be met. ..
Felidty conditions: C'I:C', c#lJ, and there are salient P' with P'�1] such that the intersection of c with the set of worlds for which P'(j) neither equals C, nor 0, nor c' . The asserti on of (36) changes the common ground to those worlds in which John drank only water, under the felidty conditions that this proposition is poss ible at the current point of discourse and is informative, and that there are salient properties comparable with the property of drinking only water such that it would have been poss ible to assert them of John, and they would have made a differen ce.
In concluding this section, I want to point out that we did not use any coindexing between focus operators and their focus. We could do without that because the function of indexing is inherent in the syntactic-semantic rules. They guarantee that each focus (which might be complex) is related to exactly one focus operator. If there were more focus operators than foci, then some operators could not be applied to a focus-bac kground structure, thus yielding an illformed semantic representation. On the other hand, if there were more foci than focus operators to bind them, the final representation would consist of uninterpreted focus background structures, which again is ill formed. The rules guarantee, furthermo re, that a focus operator has scope over its focus. We can conclude that the proposed syntactic coindexing is both motivated and made redundant by the syntactic-semantic rules.
4.
Further Adaptations
In this section, I will discuss some constructions that are problematic for the representation format developed above, and I will propose possib le solutions.
.
DISCONTINUOUS CONSTITUENTS. -We have assumed that non-complex focus applies to syntactic constituents. There are, however, examples that show that this is not always he case. In (38.a), a variation of an example in Jacobs (1983), the particle nllr clearly can focus on sich rtlSiert, but note that this forms a discontinous constituent on surface structure. Also, in (38.b) the particle gertulezu focusses on the verb her.llsfortlerte, which is discontinuous. Similarly, in (38.b) only may focus on tllm off, which again does not form a constituent on surface structure.
One way to cope with such cases is to assume that certain transformations may follow focus assignment, that is, focus assignment does happen at a representation level prior to surface structure (d. 39.a for the case of 38.b). 
b. (diese Tat] i (forderte]j t i seinen Ehrgeiz geradezu1 (HERAUS lt � ]F 1
Another indication that focus marking may apply to some level of deep structure is that in some cases the operator does not seem to c-c:ommand its focus. One example mentioned by Jackendoff (1972) is that ftIePJ (but not, e.g., only) might be associated with the subject as focus in (40): (40.a) JOHN (even) wiD (even) have given his daughter a new bicycle. Accordi ng to Jackendoff, eDen c-command s the subject in both positions, as he assumed a "flat" structure ls NP (even) ( AU Xwill] (even) VP]. Alternatively, we might assume that the c command condition is checked at an underlying level of syntactic representation, or at a surface structure that contains traces, where it suffices that an operator c-commands the TRACE of its focus. The latter option was proposed by Jacobs (1986) for similar constructions in
German.
In any case, the syntactic and semantic rules specified above are strictly surface.oriented and hence cannot treat the phenomena discussed here as they stand. Changes along the lines suggested here are possi ble (that is, semantic rules that apply to non-surface structures or to enriched surface structures), but I will not carry out these modifications.
4.2.
FOCUS AND ILLOCUI10NARY OPERATORS. -We have assumed above that iDa cutionary operators always are associa ted with their own focus. This assumption probably must be qualified in several respects. For one thing, it is often difficult to determine, in a running text, where the foci should be. We might take this as an indication that iDocutionary operators do not need to be associa ted with a focus. There are other cases of operators that apparently can or canno t be associa ted with a focus, for example negation (sentence negation vs. constituent negation). Another reason to assume iUocutionary operators that are not focussing is that it sometimes seems artificial to propose for a sentence that already has an overt focus operator an additional iUocutionary focus.
In some cases, we can argue that operators that seem to have their own focus actuall y modify or specify the i1locutionary operator, so that their apparent focus actually is the focus of that operator. This was proposed by Jacobs (1988 ) for sentence mood particles in German. A case which might be explained along the same lines is English even (deviating from the analysis given in the previous section). Even has several properties which distinguishes it from apparent counterparts like only. First, even always must have wide scope over other focus operators, like only (d. 41). Second, adverbial even might be related to subject focus, in contrast to adverbial only (d. Jackendoff 1972, 42) . Third, focus on even seems to be barred , except in correction contexts (43). Finally, sentences with multiple even are considerably more difficult to get than sentences with multiple only; they have even been considered ungramma tical (d. Kay 1990, 44 Jacobs (1983) explained the possible scope relations between German sogar and nur, which are parallel to even and only. He showed that sogar is an affinnative polarity item, and that nUT does not license these items. However, English et1en may be (part of) a negative polarity item; d. if this costs even so much flS a dime, I would not buy it (note that German would use auch nUT instead of sogar in these contexts).
The observations given above fall in their place if we ass ume that et1en actually modifies the ilIocutionary operator. Then it must have wide scope over other overt operators (we have assumed this for Dlocutionary operators in general), it may focus on the subject (because the ilIocutionary operator has the subject in its scope), it could never receive focus from the Dlocutionary operator (in a sense, it is part of that operator), and we should not expect multiple even, as the ilIocutionary operator is associa ted with only one focus. Concerning this latter point, it is interesting to note that the examples with multiple even are generally such that we have to put equal stress on both foci; such as the following one, going back to Fraser 1970 (d. ICay 1990):
Even WORDS give trouble to even LlNGUISlS. But this would mean that the foci of flKJrds and linguists are not ordered with respect to each other; hence they should be described as one, complex, focus of the Dlocutionary operator modified by even.
4.3.
FOCUS AND MOVEMENT. -The theory of focus developed here does not imply any movement of the focus constituent. Jackendoff (1972) , and later Roath (1985) , argued against a movement analysis, as associ ation with focus does not obey island constraints (d. 18). Not obeying syntactic constraints, focus should preferably be treated in the semantic representation language. The reason why Chomsky (1977) proposed an analysis of focus that involves LF-movement is that cmeferenc:e between a pronoun and a NP in focus seems to obey the same restrictions as coreferen ce between a pronoun and a quantified NP. Quantified NPs, it is argued, have to move at LF, and preceding pronouns canno t be bound by them as this leads to crosso ver constellations. The relevant data are as follows; (46.a) shows that binding is o.k. with (non-moving) names, (b) shows that a focused NP cannot bind the pronoun, and (c) shows that quantified NPs behave Similarly:
(46) a. After bet came home, John i went to bed. b. ·After bet came home, JOHN i went to bed. Johnj [after hei went home, t i went to bed] c.
• After bet came home, someonej went to bed. Someonej [after bet went home, t i went to bed] A different explanation for the unavailability of (46.b), which does not recur to movement, is that expressions with a focus feature canno t refer to something that is given in the immediate context (47.a), except when used contrastively (47.b). (47) a. ·John and Mary came in. JOHN kissed Mary. b. John lcissed Mary, and then MARY kissed JOHN. One observation that supports this reinterpretation of (46.b) is that these sentences get much better in the case of contrastive focus (d. also Lujan 1986 for related data):
Another phenomenon that prima facie calls for a movement analysis was presented by Kratzer (1989) Kratzer shows that In Roo th's original approach, the VP anapher would be spelled out as In: I only went to TANGLEWOOD becallSe you went to TANGLE WOOD. This implies two foci that are, in principle, independent of each other, or a complex focus. However, example (49) involves only one simple focus; its reading can be rendered as: Only for x=Tanglewood it holds that I went to x because you went to x. Kratzer develops a theory, based on a version of alternative semantics mentioned in Rooth (1985) , that generates this reading without assuming LF-movement, but with the help of a separate process of variable binding.
The current framework allows for other solutions within structured meanings, assuming certain conditions for comparability. F irst, look at the following derivation, where we assume that the antecedent VP replaces the anaphor. , went-to(you,y'» -+ yey'-tet] Let us assu me that the interpretation of conditions like yey'-tet implies not only that y-t and y'-t, but also that y=y', as the elements of the right-hand side are equal. In general, we require that whenever X 1 .X2 ..... X n -Y.Y ..... Y, then X 1 =X2= ... =X n • Given that, we can reduce the second part of the final representation as: 'dy[y-t &: because(went-to(l,y), went to(yoa,y» -+ y-t). The reading we get, then, can be paraphrased as: I went to Tanglewood because you went to Tanglewood , and there is no alternative y to Tanglewood such that I went to Y because you went to y.
An objection against this analysis is that it would treat cases like (SO) similar to cases where the anaphor is full y spelled out, as in (51) I only went to TANGLEWOOD because you went to TANGLEWOOD. The only plausible interpretation of (51) is one in which the first occu rrence of Tanglewood is, or is contained in, the focus of only, and the second one is the focus of the illocutionary operator, which can be paraphrased by: The reason why I only went to Tanglewood is because you went to Tanglewood. This suggests a principle saying that a complex focus (whose parts are associated with the same operator) cann ot contain identical overt foci. Note that one would need an explanation of this phenomenon even if one would adopt Kratzer's solution, as her theory only makes a claim about anaphors in focus and would allow for only to be associa ted with both foci in (51).
4.4.
THE SCOPE OF FOCUS OPERATORS. -In section (3), we didn't ass ume any particular scoping rules for focus operators. Although they are essen tially propositional operators, we claimed that it is sufficient that the representations they operate on have a type that ends in t.
This guarantees that a focus operator always has the most narro w possible scope. To see this, consider at a case where an focus operator has an AP in scope. As such constructions are marginal in English (except with comparatives, e.g. an even bigger az,), I will discuss a German example:
Peter bufte ein nurt [MI'ITELMAs sIG ES]F1 Auto Peter bought an only average car The crucial thing is that nu, has scope over the adjective and has to be prevented from taking wide scope, over the whole NP, the VP, or the sentence. This is done naturally when we assume that adnominal APs are nominal modifiers of the type «e)tXe)t. Given an obvious rule for the combination of AP's with N's, we get the following interpretation, where M is a variable of type «e)tXe)t and semantic combination is by functional application: 1P3x[p(x) at average(carXx) at \fM[M-average at M(carXx) � M=average)) Thus, the focus operator nu, is applied directly to the AP. We get a predicate that applies to average cars, but not to cars that have another property comparable to average. Given a more refined analysis of only that considers its scalar properties (d. e.g. Jacobs 1983), this means that the predicate applies to cars that are maximally of average quality, but not of a higher quality.
One observation that might be a counterexample to the claim that focus operators have the most narro w scope poss ible was reported by Taglicht (1984) . According to him, the following sentence has two readings: (54) We are required to study only syntax. a. It is required that we study syntax and no other subject.
b. Only for syntax and for no other subject it is required that we study it.
In the latter reading, the express ion only syntax gets wide scope over required. Note that the wide scope interpretation of only is not possible when it is an adverbial modifier, as in we aTe required to only study syntax. A plausible explanation of this phenomenon was put forward by Rooth (1985) : NPs in general can have wide-scope reading (witness the specific interpretation of a boo k in we are required to retUl a book ), and NPs with focus operators take part in that. That is, focus operators do not get wide scope on their own, but only when carried "piggy_ back" by an expressi on that can get wide scope. However we will implement wide-scope readings of NPs -LF-movement, quantifying-in, or operator storage -, this should carry over to cases like (54).
4.5.
FOCUS ON REFLEXIVES AND REOPROCALS. The treatment of reciprocals requires some more effort. I will sketch one way how it can be done. Let us assume that we have a sum formation on individuals, fB, such that whenever x, y are i nd i viduals, so is xE9y; fB should be the join operation of a jo i n semi-lattice (d. Unk 1983).
In particular, fB is a symmetri c operation, that is, x(By = y(Bx. We also assume a list operation -that is asymmetric. Verbal predicates and relations in natural language typically are cumulative with respect to fB in the sense that whenever P(x) and P(y), then P(xfBy), and whenever R(x,x') and R(y,y'), then R(xfBx',yfBy'). Furthermore, we assume that natural language predicates and relations in general are cumulative and distributive with respect to list formation; that is, p(x) &: P(y) H P(x-y) and R(x,x') &: R(y,y') H R(x-x',y-y'). All this can be imposed by suitable meaning postulates.
The reciprocal anaphor etlch other, just like the reflexive, is bound by an antecedent. It requires that this antecedent is a list I, and i t i mposes that the verbal predicate applies to the REOPROCAL V ARlANT of that list. Before I give a general definition of this notion, let us look at two examples: The reciprocal variant of the list j-b is b-j, and the reciprocal variant of j-b-s is bfB.-jfB.-jfBb. In general, l' is the reciprocal variant of I iff I and l' have the same length, and the n-th element of l' is the sum ind i vidual of all elements of I with the exception of its n-th element. Let us assu me a function rec that maps lists to their reciprocal variants. Then the meaning of etlCh otherj is the term AP.P(rec(xi». Let us assume that coordination can be interpreted as list formation. I give an example that shows the treatment of sentences with the reciprocal in focus: Under the assumption that only lists with the same number of elements are comparable, that love is divisive for both lists and sums, and that all atomic individuals are comparable to each other, this amounts to the following:
This gives the readon of our example. However, the treatment of reciprocals is still in complete in several respects: I have showed only how the "strict" interpretation of reci- procaIs can be modelled, leaving aside the more liberal interpretation which is predominant in cases like John, Bill tnul MIlry took f!tlch otlru by the hand; I did not say anything about the formation of coordinated NPs; and I did not talk about cases with plural subjects, such as The children Ioue only au:h otIru. However, it should have become clear that a treatment of reciprocals with the help of list individuals is feasible, and can be combined with a semantics for focus operators like only in a straightforward way.
4.6.
DO WE NEED COINDEXINC? -In the framework developed above, we did without coindexing between focus operators and focus. The rules that restrict the associa tion between focus operator and focus are such that they narro w down possible choices. There are two potential problems with this approach: First, the principles may not be restrictive enough for some cases, and second, they might be 100 restrictive.
As for the first case, note that we can generate examples like the following a use coindexing here simply as a convenient description device):
We arrive at this interpretation by focusing on Bill, combining only with the V to -expression, focusing on Sue, and combining erJeJI with the VP. The resulting meaning can be described as follows: John introduced BiD to Sue, he did nothing else to Sue, and there are persons x besides Sue for which it is more likely that John introduced Bill to x and did nothing else to x. Does the sentence have this reading? It seems to me that it has it, especially if stressed on Sue, and uttered without pause in only introtlru:ed Bill.
As for the second case, the most serious objection may be raised against the assum ption that a focus operator is associa ted with the most comprehensive focus in its scope (d. 1 7). We haven't seen evidence that supports that claim. so let us look at e1evant cases. It is not easy to come up with convincing examples, but perhaps the following wiD do. The adverb preferIIb ly is focus-sensi tive, which can be seen with examples like John prefeNbly drinks WINE, which means that of all the drinks, John prefers to drink wine. Now look at the following example:
, and] John eveno preferabln drinks [(TASMANIAN]FO wine]F1. Here, it is said that John prefers Tasmanian wine to other drinks, and that there are m0-difiers X such that it would be more likely that John prefers X wine to other drinks. This seems to be a valid reading of our example, especia1I y in the given context. -Now let us look at the opposite case: Here we would expect the interpretatio n: John prefers Tasmanian wine to other wines, and it is more likely that there is some drink X such that John prefers Tasmanian X to other X. It is at least questionable whether there is such a reading. Of course, we get a reading for John weno ",eferablyl drinks [T/lSmll nUrn [WINE]FO]Fl, as predicted: John prefers Tasmanian wine to other drinks, and there are drink types X (e.g. beer ) such that it would be more likely that John prefers Tasmanian X to other drinks.
There is, however, one class of examples that sheds doubt on our assumption (Hubert Truckenbrodt, personal comm unication) . It is known that gapping is a focus..sensi tive process , in the sense that the gap in one coordina tion part corresponds to the background in the other Sag 1977 , Truckenbrodt 1988 In this section, I could give only limited evidence for our assumption that a focus operator is associa ted with the most comprehensive focus in its domain. If further data shows that this is not the case, then the focus rule SF has to be folUluJated in an indetelUlinistic way • If, on the other hand, cases of embedded foci that neither contain intervening focus operators, such as (19.c), nor focus on one and the same constituent, such as (19.d), are considered to be in general bad, than SF has to be refOIUlUlated in such a way that it can never apply to a focus background representation to begin with, but may apply to one constituent and generate a multiple focus on that constituent at once (to cover indisputable cases like 19.d).
4.7.
ASSERTIONAL MEANING AND PREsupPOSmONS. -The analysis of focus-sensi tive operators like only and efJeJI we have given so far neglects one well-known aspect of their semantics, namely that we have to distinguish between the assertional meaning on the one hand and the presupposition or conventional implicature on the other (d. Hom 1969) Taking constancy under negation as a test for presupposi tions, we can observe that a sentence like John only drtln1c flMfer asserts that John didn't drink anything but water, and presupposes that John drank water. And we observe that a sentence like John drtmk erJen Wtlfer asserts that John drank water, and presupposes that it would have been more likely for John to drink something else. b. -John drank even water.
-No. (i.e., John didn't drink water; not: it was likely for John to drink water). We might ask whether it is possible to extend the framework developed above so that it incorporates the distinction between assertio n and presupposition, something that was done by Lyons &: Hirst (1990) for Alternative Semantics. Cases with complex foci will natura1ly be of particular interest. For example, consider (1 2 ), here repeated as (64):
e., John did other, comparable things as well). As the negation test shows, this sentence asserts that John d id not do other things comparable to drinking water. Its other meaning components listed under (12), then, must be its presuppositions -viz., that John drank water (coming from only), and that there are ac tivities comparable to drinking walei' and doing nothing else for which it is more probable that John performed them (coming from eDen). Note that we have to refer to both the assertional meaning and the presupposition coming from only to express this second presupposi tion.
How can we spell out the semantics of focusing operators like only, taking into account the asserti onal part and the presuppositional part? Perhaps the most explicit theory that was designed to treat asserti onal meaning and presuppositional meaning in a mmpositional way is Karttunen & Peters (1979) . In particular, they include a treatment of eDen, although they disregard the influence of focus-backgrouncl structures. Here I want to show how their theory can be mmbined with the framework of structured meanings.
Karttu nen & Peters represent (asserti onal) meanings and presuppositions on two separate levels, which contain what the sentece EXPRESSES and what it IMPLICATES. (i.e., pre supposes). This is rendered fonnally as a pair <E, I>, where E and I are of the same type. Karttunen & Peters show how meanings and presuppositions of complex expressions can be computed from the meanings and presuppositions of their parts, using a special "heritage function".
How are meaning-presup posi ton structures and focus-background structures related to each other? Examples like (65) suggest that focus-background structures always have "wide scope" over meaning-presupposition structures. Here I will not introduce a formal semantic framework for meaning-presupposition structures, as this would lead us too far astray. I will restrict the discussion to one illustrative example.that shows how cases with several focusing operators can be treated in principle.
In the following, I ass ume, for the sake of exposition, that Ilnnle presupposes that the agent of the drinking is animate, and that the substance that is drunk is fluid. These pre suppositions are projected to the complex expressio n, Ilranle WGfer, with a mechanism Hke the one given by Karttunen & Peters. The alternatives of focus-sensitive operators, like eoen, then may be determined by the conjunction of the meaning and the presupposition of the focus element; note that we have to assume a conjunction generaHzed for an types based on t, as the focus often will not be of a sentential type. The revised meaning postulates for only and eoen are obvious from the following example, so I will not specify them separately. The meaning part of this pair, [3](j), expresses that everything that John did was drinking water, or more correctly, that no property P comparable, but not identical to the property of drinldng water applies to John. Note that this is also the meaning of the simpler sentence John only dNnk fDtlfer, which shows that ewn does not change the meaning of an expressi on.
The presupposition part of that pair says that there is a property P comparable to the property of only drinking water such that this property would more likely apply to John. More precisely, it claims this of a property P that applies to persons that didn't do anything comparable, but not identical to drinking water, that drank water, that are animate, and for which it holds that water is a fluid. It seems unclear whether the latter two properties (abbreviated as [2]) should be part of the determination of the alternatives. However, we need at least the presupposition introduced by only (abbreviated as [1]), and as it is not plausible that we keep track of the origins of a presupposition, we are forced to take all presuppositions accum ulated so far (here represented by [4]). Note, again, that it is crucial that the detenn ination of the alternatives may refer to both the meaning and the presuppositions of the semantic representation of its focus. We have assumed this for the alternatives for wen; we may assume the same for the alternatives for only, for the sake of greater homogeneity.
4.8.
TOPIC-COMMENT STRUCTURES. -Let us finally tum to a particularly vexing problem. It was pointed out by Jacobs (1988 , to appear) with examples like the following one: (67) SUE KISSED John. There is a reading involving a complex focus on Sue and kissed , as an answer to a qestion like Who dill _t to John?, which can be derived in a standard way (d. 67' .a). In addition, there is also a reading where Slle and Idssetl seem to form a simple focus, at least semanticall y: (67) may be an answer to WIIlI t Iuq1peneJl to John?, where the focus is equivalent to fDtlS kisSl!Il by Sue. For this case, we would be inclined to assume the representation (67' .b): (67') a. ASSEllT(d.xell.R(j,x), IJduecl» b. ASSEll T(�.P(j), 1xJdssed(I,x» ) The problem here is how to arrive at representation (b) in a compositional way, given that the parts of the sentence that correspond to the focus do not form a syntactic constituent at any level, according to standard analyses of these sentences.
One way to do overcome this problem is to assume that the sentences in question indeed have an analysis in which the parts in focus form a syntactic constituent. This could be expressed quite naturally in a syntactic framework like categorial grammar with liberal rules of category composition. Advocates of categorial grammar may welcome these facts as another r -r
.. Another way is to analyze these cases not as involving peculiar focus-background structures, but as rather regular TOPIC-COMMENT structures. The relevant examples of purported non constituent focus all have a purported background that IS a constituent, and they are examples that answer questions like What happened to %? So we might analyze them as cases where the purported background is, in fact, the topic of the sentence, and the purported focus is the comment Topic-comment structures can be captured with the same technique as focus-background structures, namely structured meanings. Actually, Dahl (1974) proposed both a separate treatment of focus-background structures and topic-comment structures, and a way to model them that can be seen as a precursor of structured meanings.
One crucial question at this point is how topic-comment structures and focus-background structures interact. It seems that we should allow for both the comment and the topic to consist of focus-background structures (d. We also might analyze kissed John as a focus of the comment in this case; alternatively, we might skip aSSignment of focus, given a rule that whenever the comment does not contain any focus feature, it should be considered as focus itself.
This suggests the following framework for topic-comment structures: Topic-comment structures are labelled pairs qa,lb, where a is the comment and p is the topic. Both a and p may be simple, or they may contain focus-background structures. lllocutionary operators, like asserti on, may take topic-comment-structures as their argument. We have the following rule for assertions applying to simple topic-comment structures: -p is a possible topic in c, that is, p, or something closely related to p, was mentioned in the immedi ately preceding discourse, or is part of the environment of speaker and hearer, or is something the speaker and hearer talk regularly about The first set of felicity conditions covers the conditions specified in (7); the only difference is that now the first member of the pair qu,p> counts as "focus". The second set of felicity
conditions is concerned with the topic; it leaves much to be explained, but should give an idea of a poss ible way to spell out the semantic impact of topics.
We have to change (69) slightly for complex topic-comment structures. I propose the fol lowing: .backgro u structure in the comment determines alternative commeit ts that could have been made about the topic, and the focus-background structure in the topic determines alternative topics that could have been "commented " upon. We should also account for the possibil ity of topic-Iess sentences (so-called tbetic sentences); in this case, we may assume our old asserti on rule (7).
Topic-commen t structures and focus.-baclcground structures do interact in the derivation of a complex semantic representation. The basic principle is that topic-comment structures take precedence over focus-background structures. Furthermore, topic-commen t structures are not recursive; we should allow, however, for the possibUity of mmplex topics, as attested e.g. in Hungarian (Kiss 1986) . This leads to the following rules of functional apptication, in addition to the rules given in The topic feature can be spelled out in various ways, for example in the lIS for NP-construction, or in languages Hke Japanese and Korean by affixa tion of particles. As for accentual markings, the basic rule seems to be that topical constituents are de-accented (as a whole; they may &.
.. _.&.
contain accents in case they contain a focus constituent, as in 68.b). This implies that the non topical constituents get accent (or "neutral stress ", in the theory of Jacobs 1988, to appear).
It is time to look at an example. Let's take one with a simple topic, John, and a comment, drtlnJc fDtlter, that contains a focus, fDtlter: current point in discourse. In addition, John must be a possible topic at the current point in discourse.
(75) kiss ed ; V'F ; d.RR. kill> I I John ; NPr ; <TATI, John> 1/ 52 kissed John ; VP; < T ATd.lU.x.T(Ay.R(x,y), kill» , John> I I Sue ;�;<1TI, Sue> 1/ 51 Sue kissed John ; S ;
<TAT<A1"-R.1"(b.T(Ay.R(X,y))), Sue-kisl>, John>
Now the application operator yields the following result It is asserted that Sue kissed John, with the feHdty condition that there are salient pairs of representations T-R that are comparable to Sue-kill such that ATe1"(b.T(Ay. R(x,y))) (roughly, 1" did R to him) could have been asserted of John as well at the curren t point in discourse. Again, John must be a possi ble topic at the curren t point in discourse.
5.
Conclusion
In this article, I have bied to develop a coherent semantic framework that can capture sentences with multiple focus, both free focus and focus bound by overt operators. Structured meanings turned out to be a suitable representation fonnat, and I have shown how a compositional semantics can be developed for those sentences within that fonnat. In doing this, we have seen that much of the burden that was assigned to syntax in coindexing approaches such as Jacobs (1984, 1988 , to appear) can in fact be taken over by well-formedness principles in the semantic component.
There are several directions into which this approach can be extended. One is to see whether we indeed need the full expressibi lity of structured meanings, or whether the more parsimonio us framework of alternative semantics (d. Roo th 1985) can be worked out to cover multiple focus constructions as well . Secondly, we should address the various shortcomings mentioned in aection (4) above, such as focus assignment to expressi ons that are not sutface constituents, focus assignmen t to expressio ns that are not in the scope of their operator on surface structure, and a combination of the structured meaning framework with a way to express different scopings of NPs. Also, the proposed interaction between topic-comment structures and focus-baclcground structures need s much more work; it might tum out that insights of the theory of communicative dynamism, as developed in the Czech schoo l by Firbas, Hajicova, Sgall and others are expresst"ble in this framework. F inaIly, it is necessa ry to extend the framework such that it can cover the impact of focus on the interpretation of quantifiers, such as .'wys (d. Rooth 1985 (d. Rooth , 1988 or the genericity operator (d. Krifka, to appear). To do this with the required generality, we must provide for a mechanism to express anaphoric bindings, which requires a dynamic semantic framework, such as discourse representation theory or one of its alternatives. 
